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1. The Eastern Neighbours and Russia 
Beyond pragmatism 
Hungarian political parties, except some minor liberal ones from the so-called democratic opposition, 
pursue a strong pro-Russian foreign policy. The incumbent conservative government party, Fidesz has 
made a U-turn in its Russia relations since 2010. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a staunch critic of Rus-
sia for two decades, has turned into one of Moscow’s most vocal defenders in the midst of its war in 
eastern Ukraine. Prime Minister Orbán concluded a huge nuclear deal with Rosatom in January 2014 
and continues to pursue an intensive “gas diplomacy” with Moscow. The right-wing radical party Job-
bik, Hungary’s second-strongest party, has criticised the government’s pro-European stance and fa-
vours even more engagement with Moscow - a historically unprecedented orientation for a radical 
right-wing party. Some scandals have also revealed financial support to Jobbik from Russia in the 
past. Major leftist opposition parties cautiously criticised Orbán’s Russia and foreign policy on various 
grounds. Nonetheless, they also have a relatively pro-Russian legacy, since the Hungarian Socialist 
Party and the Feremc Gyurcsány led cabinet engaged Moscow in different pipeline and political issues 
prior to 2010. 
The Hungarian Prime Minister’s turn towards Russia certainly has a strong economic justification. 
Energy is a major issue in this regard; the bilateral deals signal strong quid pro quo relations (roughly 
70% of all gas and oil demand is covered by Russian imports). Prime Minister Orbán also criticised the 
sanctions as counter-productive and harmful for European economies. Budapest would like to normal-
ise relations and minimise the negative consequences of the Ukraine crisis for bilateral relations. The 
government’s Russia policy is more driven by utilitarian considerations, and maybe to some extent 
also by its EU-scepticism, coupled with ignorance of democratic deficits in Russia, rather than by ide-
ology or “grand visions”. Given the pro-Russian domestic party landscape, this policy line remains less 
risky and costly in terms of popular support, than any pro-Atlantic stance.  
Public opinion polls show a more balanced picture, with Hungarians being traditionally more scepti-
cal towards Moscow. Russia faces a setback if asked about general sympathies: Germany, United 
States, and even China have better rankings. Nevertheless, this is often not translated into party poli-
tics. For example even if almost half of the potential Jobbik voters would rather support the US than 
Russia in a “new Cold War”, they remain ignorant to the right-wing radical party’s strong pro-Russia 
line.  
Link:  
 “I am Eurasian” – The Kremlin connections of the Hungarian far-right: 
http://www.politicalcapital.hu/wp-content/uploads/PC_SDI_Boll_study_IamEurasian.pdf 
All quiet on the Hungarian front… 
The events in Ukraine did not significantly change Hungary’s relations with the Eastern Partnership 
countries. The main reason is that Hungary has never been a particularly enthusiastic or proactive 
supporter of the Eastern Partnership project, well demonstrated by the annual European Foreign Poli-
cy Scorecard surveys. Budapest concentrated its activities mostly on Moldova and on the partly Hun-
garian-populated Transcarpathian region of Ukraine. The latter receives more than 90 per cent of all 
Hungarian development aid funds spent in the Eastern neighbourhood. 
In addition to this, since 2010 Hungary has been striving to establish and maintain good relations 
with Azerbaijan. This is mostly motivated by gas import interests, while concerns related to the demo-
cratic and human rights situation in Azerbaijan play no role at all. This is a structural element that is 
not going to be changed by the Ukraine crisis. The suspended diplomatic relations with Armenia are 
also not going to improve, because Yerevan would require Budapest to apologise for a pro-Azerbaijani 
move – in 2012 Hungary transferred a former Azerbaijani officer sentenced to lifelong imprisonment 
for murdering an Armenian soldier in Budapest to Baku, where he was immediately pardoned and 
promoted to national hero – which Hungary will not do in the near future. 
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Relations with Georgia and Belarus have been slowly, but steadily improving. The only minor 
change is that, in line with the government’s strong foreign trade orientation, Budapest has started to 
push for improving the EU-Belarus relations, regardless of the domestic political situation in the coun-
try. While official Hungarian arguments stress the positive role played by Minsk in mediating the 
Ukraine ceasefire negotiations, in reality Budapest perceives Belarus both as an attractive export mar-
ket and also as a possible partner in circumventing the Russian agricultural counter-sanctions. 
All in all, the crisis did not change the Eastern Partnership-related prioritisation of Hungary, i.e. no 
new priorities were defined, or old priorities abandoned. Obviously, more attention is paid to Ukraine, 
but the overall strategic objectives and policies remained the same. 
Links:  
 European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2015: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR125_ 
SCORECARD_2015.pdf 
 The Eastern Partnership is a bridge between Western and Eastern parts of Europe: 
http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/the-eastern-
partnership-is-a-bridge-between-western-and-eastern-parts-of-europe 
Limited expectations with little disappointment 
Hungary had two main interests to achieve at the Riga Summit, making two proposals aimed at them. 
The first one was to immediately grant visa-free travel to Ukrainian citizens, motivated mainly by the 
above-described special interests about the Hungarians living in Ukraine. Following the summit, Prime 
Minister Orbán admitted that this did not succeed and criticised the EU for its delay. 
The second Hungarian proposal was aimed at the further differentiation of the Eastern Partnership. 
However, the idea was not to prioritise the countries that made the most progress, i.e. Georgia and 
Moldova, but to further deepen energetic cooperation with Azerbaijan, a possible source of non-
Russian gas supplies for Europe. As none of the two main Hungarian proposals went through, Orbán 
declared the summit only to be moderately successful. 
The summit kept silent about the issue of membership perspective to Georgia, Ukraine, or Moldo-
va, as well as about visa-free travel to the EU for the latter two, causing some disappointment in Bu-
dapest. Expectations in these respects are still vivid, regardless of the fact that in reality membership 
perspective has never been on the EU agenda and moreover, EaP countries were certainly fully aware 
of this. However, the expert community had a more balanced position and managed to point out the 
important results of the summit too, for example the benefits Ukraine actually got, such as a concrete 
deadline of introducing a visa free regime and the promise that the DCFTA will indeed come into force 
from 1
st
 January 2016, thus there will be no further delay. Moreover, Kyiv also received a massive loan 
of 1.8 billion euro. 
Links:  
 Visa liberalisation with the Eastern neighbourhood (2014): http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/ 
2014/wider/44 
 Lifting the EU’s visa requirement for citizens of Ukraine still unresolved: 
http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/lifting-the-eu-s-visa-requirement-for-
citizens-of-ukraine-still-unresolved 
 Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga - the Picture is Not That Dark: 
http://www.ceid.hu/ukraine-and-the-eastern-partnership-summit-in-riga-the-picture-is-not-
that-dark/ 
Not too much enthusiasm for an EU army…  
At present, there is no high-level public discussion in Hungary about the need for a unified EU army. 
However, the general official position of the Hungarian government is critical to the further deepening 
of EU integration in general. Instead, Budapest frequently emphasises the importance of maintaining 
the sovereignty of the member states.  
Besides, according to the relevant policy documents of Hungary, Budapest considers NATO to be 
the primary guarantor of its military security and defence. Hence, in line with the alliance’s perception 
of Russia as a source of increasing threat, Budapest was fully supportive of the Wales declaration, 
among them the stationing of NATO troops in the Baltic States and the establishment of a Very High 
Readiness Task Force. Besides, in line with the Wales decisions, Budapest committed itself to in-
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crease its military spending; moreover, from September 2015 JAS-39 Gripen fighters of the Hungarian 
Air Force will contribute to the defence of the airspace of the Baltic States. In addition to all these, 
Hungarian defence and special forces started to dedicate particular attention to the threat from Rus-
sia’s so-called hybrid warfare too. However, all these activities have been and will be conducted deci-
sively in the framework of NATO.  
These two factors implicitly mean that Budapest would be against the idea of setting up a unified 
EU army, even though there is no publicly available specific official position on the issue. Instead, 
Budapest would probably emphasise the importance of NATO in guaranteeing the security and de-
fence of Europe. 
Links: 
 Hungary’s National Security Strategy: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Hongrie_-_2012_-_ 
National_Security_Strategy.pdf 
 Hungary’s National Military Strategy: http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/b/ae/e0000/ 
national_military_strategy.pdf 
2. EU Enlargement 
More scepticism about Eastern enlargement 
While fully supportive of the EU’s enlargement to the Western Balkans, Hungary had been somewhat 
sceptical towards the Eastern enlargement even before the beginning of the Ukraine crisis. Hence, the 
breakout of the crisis and the subsequent war only added to the existing reluctance and scepticism of 
Hungarian elites and public about whether countries of Eastern Europe should ever be admitted to the 
European Union.  
This is particularly so because the Orbán government – largely in common with its predecessors – 
intends to maintain good relations with Russia, and perceives the situation in Ukraine through the lens 
of Hungary’s Russia-related interests. This policy, however, is not motivated by a value-related choice, 
but decisively by economic interests, mainly by energy-related considerations. And, as Russia is 
strongly opposed to the EU’s Eastern Partnership gaining too much influence in the Eastern neigh-
bourhood, Hungary cannot afford pursuing an enlargement-oriented Eastern policy in the region with-
out risking alienation with Moscow.  
Moreover, the often Russia-sympathetic policy of the government is further challenged by the 
strongest opposition party, the far-right Jobbik, which pursues an openly pro-Russian, anti-Western 
and anti-Kyiv foreign policy and reportedly has close connections to the Kremlin. The pressure from 
Jobbik may constitute an important factor pushing the Orbán government to make unusually radical 
remarks about Ukraine (questioning the future of Ukraine as a state, demanding autonomy for Trans-
carpathia while fighting in the East had just begun, etc.) in order not to let the radical party dominate 
the communication agenda. Leftist parties (Democratic Coalition, Hungarian Socialist Party) support 
the EU’s eastward enlargement but often underline the importance of preserving regional stability dur-
ing the process. Smaller liberal and green parties are unambiguously in favour of enlargement, espe-
cially in the light of Russian aggression.  
Links:  
 Orbán: autonomy of Hungarian minority in Ukraine needed for stability: 
http://www.politics.hu/20140517/orban-on-autonomy-forex-borrowers-new-govt/ 
 European Far Right and Putin: http://www.aspeninstitute.cz/en/article/3-2014-european-far-
right-and-putin/ 
Integration to fight migration? 
In case of EU enlargement toward the Western Balkans and Turkey, the Hungarian government has 
declared its continuous support for the process. The Hungarian foreign minister suggested accelerat-
ing EU accession negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro and starting accession talks with Macedo-
nia as well.  
Beside its geographic proximity, the region is considered to have key importance for the future of 
Hungary and Central Europe’s energy security. Turkey as a newly emerging economic power of the 
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region is also considered an important target partner of the Hungarian ‘Eastern opening’ policy, aiming 
at strengthening economic ties with extra-EU countries. 
Recently, the main arguments for rapid integration of the Western Balkans are connected to migra-
tion and security issues: it would help to manage the migration pressure on the European Union and 
help containing the flow of foreign fighters recruited for the Islamic State as well. The building of a 
fence preventing illegal border-crossings on the Serbian border of Hungary has raised some tension 
between the two countries. It was, however, eased after joint government declarations on further co-
operation and stronger support for Serbia’s EU integration. Hungarian police helps to patrol the Serbi-
an-Macedonian border as well.  
Links: 
 Péter Szíjjártó supports acceleration of EU enlargement: http://www.kormany.hu/en/ 
ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/peter-szijjarto-supports-acceleration-of-eu-
enlargement 
 Hungary backs Turkeys EU membership: http://www.worldbulletin.net/hungary-backs-
turkeys-eu-membership/153836/hungary-backs-turkeys-eu-membership 
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